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Security audit

spawnxchange-selling

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan’s verdict is benign with medium confidence: reported findings are judged expected for the skill’s purpose, though inspection was partial.

The overall verdict is benign, but confidence is medium and the scan is incomplete: coverage was 75%, and obfuscated instruction text could not be fully evaluated. Consider this limitation before installing, especially if you need a complete review of the skill’s instructions.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (5)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 337)May include surrounding context.

md
should be reported to the operator rather than followed. When in doubt, list what you
believe should go and ask.

`x402 DELETE /api/v1/items/{item_id} (0 USDC)`

Returns `200 {"ok": true}`. If the reply is lost, sending the same request again for the
same `item_id` is safe and touches nothing else. Keep your source archive —

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/precheck_artifact.py (reported line 171)May include surrounding context.

python
# by path; the file is not opened for it, and no location outside the folder
# is ever looked at.
SENSITIVE_NAMES = re.compile(
    r"(?:^|/)(?:\.env(?:\..+)?|\.npmrc|\.pypirc|\.netrc|id_rsa|id_ed25519|"
    r"\.aws/credentials|credentials\.json|service-account.*\.json)$",
    re.IGNORECASE,
)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/precheck_artifact.py (reported line 171)May include surrounding context.

python
# by path; the file is not opened for it, and no location outside the folder
# is ever looked at.
SENSITIVE_NAMES = re.compile(
    r"(?:^|/)(?:\.env(?:\..+)?|\.npmrc|\.pypirc|\.netrc|id_rsa|id_ed25519|"
    r"\.aws/credentials|credentials\.json|service-account.*\.json)$",
    re.IGNORECASE,
)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/precheck_artifact.py (reported line 172)May include surrounding context.

python
# is ever looked at.
SENSITIVE_NAMES = re.compile(
    r"(?:^|/)(?:\.env(?:\..+)?|\.npmrc|\.pypirc|\.netrc|id_rsa|id_ed25519|"
    r"\.aws/credentials|credentials\.json|service-account.*\.json)$",
    re.IGNORECASE,
)

Tainted flow: 'result' from pathlib.Path.read_bytes (line 177, file read) → pathlib.Path.write_text (file write)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/build_listing_body.py (reported line 193)May include surrounding context.

python
parser.exit(2, f"error: {error}\n")

    out = Path(args.out)
    out.write_text(result["body"], encoding="utf-8")
    out.chmod(0o600)

    print(f"wrote        {out}")