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Security audit

spawnxchange-cdp-cli

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan rates this skill suspicious because it flags external transmissions for review and could not fully inspect all content; the available evidence does not establish malicious intent.

Treat this as a review decision, not a finding of malicious behavior. Before installing, verify the external destinations and what data may be sent, and consider that only half of the reported components were scanned and instruction checks were partial.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (4)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 139)May include surrounding context.

md
MAX_AMOUNT_RAW=1000000                                    # the most you will pay: $1.00

# 1. Ask without paying. The reply says what is required.
curl -sS -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{}'   "$SX/api/v1/items/$ITEM/acquire" > "$TEMP_DIR/challenge.json"

# 2. Check it before signing anything: your chain only, settled in that chain's USDC,
#    and no more than the ceiling you chose before you looked.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 156)May include surrounding context.

5. Send the same request again, with the payment attached.

cdp util x402 encode --x402-version 2 --payment-requirements "$(cat "$TEMP_DIR/accepts.json")" --signature "$(cat "$TEMP_DIR/signature.txt")" --authorization "$(jq -c '.message' "$TEMP_DIR/typed_data.json")" > "$TEMP_DIR/header.txt"

curl -sS -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "PAYMENT-SIGNATURE: $(cat "$TEMP_DIR/header.txt")" -d '{"policy_accepted": true, "license_accepted": true}' "$SX/api/v1/items/$ITEM/acquire"

text

⚠️ Steps 2–5 must all use the same saved reply. Asking again produces a fresh one that

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 213)May include surrounding context.

Searching is free and needs no wallet. Ask in plain language:

bash
curl -sS "$SX/api/v1/search?q=invoice+parser&max_price=20"

You can also filter on tech_stack, min_price and max_price. The response is a plain

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/x402-call.sh (reported line 130)May include surrounding context.

sh
[ -r "$metadata" ] || { echo "--metadata cannot read: $metadata" >&2; return 2; }
        body_args+=(-F "metadata=<${metadata}")
      fi
      # No Content-Type here — curl sets it, with the boundary, and overriding it
      # breaks the upload.
    elif [ -n "$body" ]; then
      case "$body" in