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Security audit

Voice Call

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The completed scan returned a benign verdict: it found an inbound call limit bypass that could consume extra resources, but reported no evidence of malicious behavior.

The verdict is benign, but the reported limit bypass may matter if you enable inbound calls, especially with an open inbound policy. Consider whether the possible extra call charges and resource use fit your needs; the scan says restricting inbound callers and carrier limits can reduce exposure. Dynamic exploitation was not tested.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

CWE-770

Warning
Location
plugin/dist/.setup/runtime-entry-DAVdRwFP.mjs:1617
Finding

Inbound Calls Bypass the Configured Concurrent Call Limit ## Remediation Suggestions 1. **Centralize admission control.** Apply a shared capacity check to outbound initiation, inbound event admission, callback admission, and realtime stream setup. 2. **Reserve capacity atomically.** Within the serialized admission operation, compare active calls plus pending admissions against `maxConcurrentCalls` and reserve a slot before persisting a new admitted call, answering it, or issuing a stream session. 3. **Reject excess calls safely.** Return the appropriate carrier rejection response or terminate the excess call without starting media or agent work. Keep rejection handling idempotent across webhook retries. 4. **Release reservations reliably.** Release pending reservations on provider errors, persistence failures, cancellation, and shutdown. Release active capacity when calls terminate. 5. **Cover all inbound paths.** Ensure realtime Twilio setup and other carrier event paths cannot bypass the shared admission mechanism. 6. **Add regression tests.** With `maxConcurrentCalls: 1`, test overlapping signed inbound events, mixed inbound/outbound traffic, simultaneous admission attempts, callbacks, realtime admission, and webhook retries. Verify that only one call is admitted and that failed admissions do not leak capacity. 7. **Use operational safeguards.** Until patched, restrict inbound callers where feasible and configure carrier-side concurrency and spending limits. These reduce exposure but do not replace application-level enforcement.

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: plugin/dist/.setup/runtime-entry-DAVdRwFP.mjs:1617–1694
Related Control: plugin/dist/.setup/runtime-entry-DAVdRwFP.mjs:1109–1113
Vulnerability Type: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption — CWE-770
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

The new-call event branch checks inbound caller policy but does not check concurrent-call capacity:

js
if (!call && providerCallId && event.direction) {
    const callback = event.direction === "inbound" && ctx.config.realtime.enabled
        ? await findRecentOutboundCallback(ctx, event.from)
        : void 0;
    if (event.direction === "inbound" && !callback && !shouldAcceptInbound(ctx.config, event.from)) {

After the policy-rejection branch, the complete admission segment at lines 1658–1694 creates and registers the call without enforcing maxConcurrentCalls:

js
const callId = crypto.randomUUID();
const from = event.from || "unknown";
const to = event.to || ctx.config.fromNumber || "unknown";
const { config: effectiveConfig, numberRouteKey } = resolveVoiceCallEffectiveConfig(
    ctx.config,
    event.direction === "inbound" ? to : void 0
);
const agentId = normalizeAgentId(callback?.agentId ?? effectiveConfig.agentId);
call = {
    callId,
    providerCallId,
    provider: ctx.provider?.name || "twilio",
    direction: event.direction,
    state: "ringing",
    from,
    to,
    sessionKey: resolveVoiceCallSessionKey({
        config: {
            ...effectiveConfig,
            agentId
        },
        callId,
        phone: event.direction === "outbound" ? to : from,
        coreSession: ctx.coreSession
    }),
    agentId,
    startedAt: Date.now(),
    transcript: [],
    processedEventIds: [],
    metadata: {
        initialMessage: event.direction === "inbound"
            ? effectiveConfig.inboundGreeting || "Hello! How can I help you today?"
            : void 0,
        ...numberRouteKey ? { numberRouteKey } : {},
        ...callback ? 
...[truncated 3735 chars]

SkillSpector findings are pending for this release.

Endor dependency reachability

Checked Nov 16, 2026 · 2:50 AM UTC

No reachable vulnerabilities reported

Endor dependency scan completed.