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Security audit

Omron Biz Backend Foundation

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan marks this plugin suspicious because its upload tool can read gateway-accessible files by a model-selected path and send them to the configured business backend without checking that the caller owns them.

Consider the risk of files readable by your gateway being uploaded to the configured business backend. Before installing, confirm the plugin is limited to trusted users and that the backend's access controls are suitable for sensitive data; the scan did not establish who can retrieve uploaded files.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

MCP07

Error
Location
plugin/dist/src/tools/common/files.js:208
Finding

Unrestricted Local File Upload Can Disclose Gateway-Owned Sensitive Files ## Remediation Suggestions 1. **Replace model-selected filesystem paths with trusted attachment identifiers.** Resolve opaque attachment IDs through gateway-managed metadata rather than accepting arbitrary `filePath` values. 2. **Enforce attachment ownership and provenance.** Bind each uploadable attachment to its sender, session, and authorized workflow. Reject files without a matching trusted record. 3. **Restrict filesystem access if path support is unavoidable.** - Use a dedicated attachment directory. - Canonicalize the permitted root and candidate path, then enforce path-aware containment. - Reject symbolic-link escapes. - Use platform-appropriate symlink-safe opening and verify the opened file descriptor to reduce check-to-read race conditions. - Do not rely on string-prefix checks or file-extension validation as authorization. 4. **Require trusted approval for exceptional exports.** Any upload outside the authorized attachment set should require host-enforced approval bound to the specific file and destination, not merely an instruction in the tool description. 5. **Reduce exposure and resource consumption.** Run the gateway with least-privilege filesystem access, apply upload-size limits, and restrict outbound destinations to approved backend origins. 6. **Add regression tests.** Verify rejection of configuration files outside the attachment root, symlink escapes, cross-session attachments, unregistered paths, and oversized files. Confirm that legitimate caller-owned attachments still upload successfully.

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location:

  • plugin/dist/src/tools/common/files.js:178–230 — model-controlled path handling, filesystem access, and upload invocation.
  • plugin/dist/src/tools/common/files.js:108–133 — authenticated multipart transmission.
  • plugin/dist/index.js:33–35 — registration of the exposed upload tool.

Vulnerability Type: Externally Controlled File Path Leading to Sensitive Information Disclosure — CWE-73 / CWE-200
Risk Level: High
Confidence: High for the unrestricted read-and-upload capability; attacker retrieval from storage depends on backend access controls.

Technical Analysis

The model-exposed common-file-upload tool accepts a filesystem path supplied through tool arguments:

js
const filePath = typeof params?.filePath === "string" ? params.filePath.trim() : "";

Execution validates the caller's channel identity and backend configuration, then checks that the selected path is a nonempty regular file. These checks do not establish that the file belongs to the caller or originated from an attachment in the current conversation.

The file is then read and packaged for transmission. The following complete read-and-package segment occurs at plugin/dist/src/tools/common/files.js:208–211:

js
const fileBuffer = await fsp.readFile(filePath);
const fileBlob = new Blob([fileBuffer], { type: contentType });
const formData = new FormData();
formData.append("file", fileBlob, uploadFileName);

The upload is initiated at line 230:

js
resp = await postFormDataWithAuth({ config, baseUrl, headers: ctxHeaders, timeout }, UPLOAD_FILE_PATH, formData);

The multipart helper transmits the supplied contents using the configured backend URL and authentication token:

js
const url = `${ctx.baseUrl}${path}`;
const headers = withAuthorizationHeader(ctx.headers, token);
let resp;
try {
    resp = await fetch(url, {
        method: "POST",
        headers,
        body: formData,
        signal: AbortSignal.
...[truncated 2846 chars]

SkillSpector findings are pending for this release.

Endor dependency reachability

Checked Nov 13, 2026 · 2:41 AM UTC

No reachable vulnerabilities reported

Endor dependency scan completed.