Security audit

Celiums Cognition

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a powerful, mostly coherent memory plugin, but it needs Review because some optional tools can access or retain private project and prompt data more broadly than their docs indicate.

Install only if you want a heavy, persistent cognition stack and can operate it like infrastructure. Keep exposedTools on curated unless you have reviewed the all-tools surface, use a dedicated single-tenant database where possible, avoid logging sensitive prompts through ethics_audit until the retention mismatch is fixed, and verify Docker/network endpoints and credentials before production use.

VirusTotal

62/62 vendors flagged this plugin as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.dangerous_exec, suspicious.dynamic_code_execution, suspicious.env_credential_access (+3 more)

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical

Code: suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location: dist/chunk-RWZ5QS2I.js:26
Evidence: const r = spawnSync(cmd, args, { stdio: "inherit" });

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical

Code: suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location: dist/chunk-662ROSFZ.js:2959
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode);

Environment variable access combined with network send.

Critical

Code: suspicious.env_credential_access
Location: dist/chunk-5CO6ZX7U.js:6
Evidence: var ATLAS_URL = (process.env["CELIUMS_ATLAS_URL"] ?? "https://atlas.celiums.ai").replace(/\/$/, "");

Environment variable access combined with network send.

Critical

Code: suspicious.env_credential_access
Location: dist/chunk-662ROSFZ.js:7718
Evidence: const circadianOff = process.env["CELIUMS_RECALL_DISABLE_CIRCADIAN"] === "1";

Environment variable access combined with network send.

Critical

Code: suspicious.env_credential_access
Location: dist/chunk-NON7D4CE.js:10
Evidence: var SEARCH_URL = (process.env["CELIUMS_SEARCH_URL"] ?? "").replace(/\/$/, "");

Environment variable access combined with network send.

Critical

Code: suspicious.env_credential_access
Location: dist/chunk-XBM2XFML.js:31
Evidence: this.baseUrl = (cfg.baseUrl ?? process.env.INFERENCE_URL ?? "https://inference.do-ai.run/v1").replace(/\/+$/, "");

Environment variable access combined with network send.

Critical

Code: suspicious.env_credential_access
Location: dist/chunk-YJHGX4JE.js:6
Evidence: function llmConfigured(env = process.env) {

Environment variable access combined with network send.

Critical

Code: suspicious.env_credential_access
Location: dist/index.js:215
Evidence: ...process.env,

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical

Code: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location: dist/chunk-662ROSFZ.js:14496
Evidence: client_secret: [REDACTED],

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical

Code: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location: dist/store-52EKWAAU.js:344
Evidence: password: [REDACTED],

HTTPS certificate verification is disabled.

Warn

Code: suspicious.insecure_tls_verification
Location: dist/chunk-662ROSFZ.js:13563
Evidence: ssl: /sslmode=require/i.test(cs) || /ondigitalocean\.com/i.test(cs) ? { rejectUnauthorized: false } : void 0

HTTPS certificate verification is disabled.

Warn

Code: suspicious.insecure_tls_verification
Location: dist/store-52EKWAAU.js:346
Evidence: ssl: config.postgres.ssl ? { rejectUnauthorized: false } : void 0

Install source points to URL shortener or raw IP.

Warn

Code: suspicious.install_untrusted_source
Location: dist/compose/docker-compose.yml:117
Evidence: test: ["CMD-SHELL", "curl -sf http://127.0.0.1:9200/_cluster/health || exit 1"]