External Transmission
Medium
- Category
- Data Exfiltration
- Content
Everything above uses the CLI, which holds the credential itself and never exposes it to the caller. Use the raw HTTP form below **only** where the CLI cannot be installed — a locked-down container, a CI step, a sandbox with no package manager. If `maton` is available, `maton api` does the same job without handling a secret. Calling `https://api.maton.ai/` directly means holding a long-lived Maton API key in the process environment, where it is readable by every child process and easy to leak into logs, crash dumps, shell history, and pasted output. Handle it accordingly: - **Never print, echo, or log the key**, and never include it in output shown to the user. Check for presence, never for value:
- Confidence
- 78% confidence
- Finding
- The appendix documents a fallback mode that uses a long-lived `MATON_API_KEY` in the process environment and demonstrates direct transmission to `https://api.maton.ai/`. Although the text includes strong handling warnings, this mode materially increases secret-exposure risk because environment variables can leak to child processes, logs, crash dumps, or misconfigured tooling in agent/runtime environments.
